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Summary
This report presents the results of the application
of a standard methodology developed by IWMI to
assess the impact of irrigation management
transfer on the performance of irrigation schemes.
The methodology was applied to assess the
impact of the participatory irrigation management
program in Sri Lanka. The study was carried out
with two objectives in mind: first, to test the
proposed methodology and second, to determine
what effects participatory management has
on the performance of irrigation schemes in Sri
Lanka.
The report reviews government policies on
irrigation management reforms. The study contends
that current policies support limited farmer
participation or joint farmer-agency management of
irrigation systems, rather than the replacement of
agencies with farmer organizations (FOs). Even
though the management of subsystems has been
officially transferred to farmer organizations
government intervention remains strong.
The study analyzes the impact of the partial
management reforms on the performance of
irrigation management. The analysis is based on
data obtained from a sample of 50 large- and
medium-sized irrigation schemes in Sri Lanka.
Impacts of reforms at the farm level are analyzed
with information collected from a sample of farmers
in two major schemes.
Piecewise linear regression models are fitted to
analyze trends in selected performance indicators
during the 5-year periods before and after transfer.
The analysis compares performance in four
categories of schemes: those rehabilitated and
transferred, those turned over but not rehabilitated,
those rehabilitated but not transferred, and those
without these interventions.
Application of the impact assessment
methodology shows that, where the required data
are available, the combination of performance
measures compared before and after, and with and
without the intervention, can yield a comprehensive
picture of the impacts of management transfer.
In the Sri Lankan case, the analysis shows
that there has been a significant decline in
government recurrent expenditure in irrigation
beginning before transfer and continuing thereafter.
However, data indicate that in the transferred
schemes there has been a reversal in the trend in
government investments in O&M in the post-IMT
period. Irrigation management transfer has not
resulted in an appreciable improvement in crop
yields, the quality of irrigation services, or the
value of agricultural production. Also, rehabilitation
alone has not created significant effects. But,
where both rehabilitation and management transfer
have occurred, significant improvements in
agricultural productivity levels and returns to land
and have been observed. The infrastructure
inspections have revealed underinvestment in
maintenance. To eliminate the backlog of deferred
maintenance, both the government and the farmers
would have to substantially increase investment in
maintenance. This raises concerns about
sustainability of the schemes under participatory
management.1
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irrigation management performance, government
finances, and the farming community (Vermillion
1997). With some exceptions (e.g., Svendson and
Vermillion 1994; Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo
1996) most studies that deal with impacts of
irrigation management reform, refer to relatively
short-term results.
It is important that impacts of management
reforms on the performance of irrigation systems
are carefully analyzed and understood, in order to
set the record straight, and more crucially
because of the significance of such analyses for
policy decisions pertaining to the irrigation sector.
Towards this end, IWMI embarked on a research
program to develop and field-test a standard
methodology that would generate useful measures
of impacts of irrigation management reforms in a
variety of settings and permit international
comparison of the impacts of irrigation
management reforms.
2 This report presents the
results of the application of the methodology to
assess the impact of irrigation management
reforms in Sri Lanka. This study was designed
and implemented with two objectives in mind:
first, to field-test the proposed methodology and
second, to determine what effects management
reforms have had on the performance of irrigation
management and irrigated agriculture in Sri Lanka.
Introduction
This report presents the results of a study carried
out in Sri Lanka to assess the impact of reforms
in the management of government-owned irrigation
schemes. The study is part of a broader effort by
the International Water Management Institute
(IWMI) to systematically document both
international experience with irrigation management
reforms and their impact on the performance of
irrigated agriculture.
The worldwide interest in, and support for,
transferring the management of irrigation schemes
from public agencies to water user groups and other
nongovernmental organizations have prompted
considerable research on various aspects of
irrigation management reforms and their impacts.
This has resulted in a wide range of opinion on the
subject.
1 The need for strong political support for
the program, clear policy direction, alternate
strategies for irrigation management, well-defined
water rights and clarity about steps involved in the
process of creating farmer organizations, and
conditions for successful irrigation management
transfer (IMT) are some of the major issues
discussed in literature (Johnson, Vermillion, and
Sargadoy 1995; Geijer, Svendsen, and Vermillion
1996; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997; Vermillion 1997).
Yet, there is little systematic, comparative
evidence to date on the impact of the reforms on
1At the first major international conference on irrigation management transfer held in Wuhan, PR China in September 1994, over 100
papers were submitted on a wide range of issues relating to irrigation management reforms.
2The proposed methodology is described in detail in Vermillion et al. 1996.2
In 1988, following a decade of field experiments,
the Government of Sri Lanka formally adopted a
policy of transferring full responsibility for the
operation and maintenance (O&M) of minor
irrigation schemes to farmer organizations (FOs).
In the medium and major schemes, farmers and
agency personnel were made jointly responsible
for the management of the systems: FOs taking
charge of O&M of irrigation facilities below the
distributary channel head, and the irrigation
agency retaining its control of the headworks and
the main canal system. This program labeled as
“Participatory Irrigation System Management” was
implemented in a number of major and medium
schemes under three government-sponsored
programs: Integrated Management of Irrigation
Schemes (INMAS), Management of Irrigation
Systems (MANIS) program, and in the systems
under the Mahaweli Development Project.
3 The
objectives of the program are to:
• relieve the government of the financial burden
of funding recurrent expenditures for irrigation
• improve the maintenance of irrigation facilities
and the irrigation service
• enhance the productivity of irrigated land and
water
• promote a sprit of self-reliance among farmers
in irrigation schemes (Abeywickrema 1986;
Brewer 1994)
Farmer organizations are fundamental to
participatory irrigation system management. Their
main function is to deal with irrigation matters, but
statutory provisions permit them the right to
formulate and implement agricultural programs for
their area, market farm produce, and distribute
production inputs (GOSL 1991). Owner cultivators
and occupiers of land in the designated area are
eligible for membership in FOs. Only one person
per plot of land is conferred membership. In most
localities, cultivating a plot of land irrigated by a
particular distributary channel, regardless of the
tenure pattern, is a sufficient qualification for
membership. FOs can become legal if they
register with the Department of Agrarian Services
and the Commissioner approves the registration.
Once they are registered, FOs get authority under
the Irrigation Ordinance to formulate rules on
maintenance, conservation, and management of
irrigation infrastructure under their jurisdiction, to
devise procedures for distributing water within the
area under their command, and to impose and
levy fees to recover the costs of O&M (IIMI/
HKARTI 1997).
The report begins with an overview of
government policy on irrigation management
transfer. The next section outlines the
methodology. We then present the results of the
analysis. The final section reviews the
methodology and concludes with some
observations on the irrigation management transfer
program in Sri Lanka.
Irrigation Management Transfer Policy
3The INMAS program was initiated in 1984. There have been thirty five schemes have been under this program, which includes most of
the large irrigation schemes in the country. The MANIS program serves the medium-sized schemes. It has been estimated that about
85 percent of the 200 schemes included under these three programs are under participatory management (IIMI/HKARTI 1997).3
Transfer of responsibilities from the
government to the FOs can take place informally
or formally. Informal transfer is a verbal agreement
between the agency and the FOs. Once FOs are
established and considered capable of handling
responsibilities, the irrigation agency formally
“hands over” the O&M of distributary channels to
FOs (IIMI/HKARTI 1997). An agreement is signed
between the FOs and the agency stipulating the
responsibilities of each party. Table 1 summarizes
management responsibilities assigned to various
entities before and after the introduction of
participatory management.
The Methodology
This study is based on the standard methodology
developed by IWMI to examine the modalities and
impacts of IMT in different country settings. By
standard methodology we mean a) a uniform set
of concepts, b) a common research design and
framework of analysis, and c) a standard set of
performance indicators.
Key Concepts
In this study, irrigation management transfer or
transfer is defined as the transfer of responsibility
and authority for managing irrigation systems from
government agencies to farmers or other local
management organizations. The term management
TABLE 1.
Assignment of responsibilities before and after participatory management.
Management function Before participatory management Participatory management
1. Seasonal planning Done by agencies and ratified at Done by Project Management
kanna (seasonal) meeting Committees
2. Operations planning Done by agencies; basic plans Done by agencies; basic plans
 ratified at kanna meetings  ratified by PMCs
3. Operation of headworks and Managed by the irrigation agency Managed by the irrigation agency
main and branch canals
4. Distributary channel operations Managed by the irrigation agency Managed by FOs
5. Field channel operations Managed by the irrigation agency Managed by field channel
groups (FCGs)
6. Maintenance of headworks and Planned and managed by the Managed by the irrigation
main and branch canals irrigation agency agency in priority order
determined by the PMCs
7. Distributary channel Planned and managed by the Planned and managed by the
maintenance irrigation agency FOs
8. Field channel maintenance Done by farmers individually or Done by the FCGs
collectively under the direction of
Field Supervisors of the
Department of Agrarian Services
Source: IIMI/HKARTI 1997.4
is used broadly to include the roles of governance,
implementation of O&M, mobilization of resources,
and resolution of disputes. Irrigation management
transfer may include all or only some of these
roles in different locations. It may be implemented
for entire irrigation systems or only at the level of
subsystem units.
The term impact assessment for irrigation
management transfer refers to the measurement,
analysis, and documentation of changes in certain
indicators of performance of irrigated agriculture,
which are imputed to be affected by irrigation
management transfer.
The term performance refers to both the
quality of management and results derived
therefrom, relative to specified criteria and
standards. Performance criteria and standards
may be internal, meaning they are defined by the
managing organization itself, or they may be
external, meaning they are defined by others who
are outside of the organization.
Objectives and Hypotheses
The general objective of the impact assessment
methodology is to determine what effect irrigation
management transfer has on the performance of
irrigation management and irrigated agriculture.
Performance is measured from several
perspectives: the cost of operating and
maintaining irrigation systems to the government
and the farmers; quality of the irrigation service;
maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure and
agricultural productivity levels. The principal
hypotheses tested are:
• IMT leads to a reduction in government
expenditure for O&M.
• IMT will increase the cost of irrigation to
farmers.
• IMT will lead to improvements in the quality of
irrigation services to farmers.
• IMT will result in improved maintenance of
irrigation facilities.
• IMT will result in higher agricultural
productivity per unit of land and water.
The Research Design
The study bases key evidence about impacts on
the comparison of performance before and after
management transfer, and with and without IMT.
The rationale for this approach is:
• Variability among irrigation schemes (which
also causes differences in performance) is
controlled through comparing performance
before and after transfer in the same irrigation
system.
• Where governments implement IMT
selectively, differences in performance may be
introduced between schemes in the selection
process itself. This could make “with” and
“without” comparisons misleading.
• The performance of transferred systems is
compared with that of non-transferred systems
to control against the possible effects of other
time-related factors such as economic trends,
which could cause changes in performance
over time.
The assessment is based on two sets of
data. The first set is from an intensive study of
two irrigation schemes (Nachchaduwa and
Hakwatuna Oya) and the other is from an
extensive survey of 50 randomly selected
schemes from four districts, Anuradhapura,
Kurunegala, Moneragala, and Hambantota where
major and medium irrigation systems are
concentrated (figure 1). The annex gives the
salient characteristics of the schemes selected for
the study.5
FIGURE 1.
Map of Sri Lanka, showing location of sample schemes.6
FIGURE 2.
Stratification of sample schemes—extensive component.
4For sampling purposes, we define rehabilitation as being restoration or improvement of irrigation scheme infrastructure (i.e., canals and
water control structures) where the annual expenditure levels exceed the average annual O&M budget by at least 50 percent. Where
expenditure in a scheme was less than 50 percent, it was not considered as rehabilitation.
The intensive component consists of a
rigorous and detailed analysis of changes in
performance in the two irrigation schemes before
and after management transfer, and validation of a
set of performance indicators that could be used
in the extensive component. The extensive
component analyzes performance according to a
small subset of indicators to enable
generalizations about the impacts of transfer.
Two common intervening variables that could
confound assessment of the impacts of
management transfer are rehabilitation and rainfall.
Where rehabilitation occurs along with transfer, it
is nearly impossible to distinguish between the
effects of transfer and rehabilitation. Similarly,
abnormal rainfall in the chosen reference years
could affect agricultural production and mask the
effects of management change.
To minimize such confounding effects,
schemes selected for the extensive survey were
first stratified into two groups: rehabilitated and un-
rehabilitated.
4 Each group is subdivided into IMT
and non-IMT groups, as illustrated in figure 2, and
analyzed separately. The confounding effects due
to rehabilitation would be the same in groups 1
and 2. It is assumed that differences in
performance between these two groups would be
due to IMT and stochastic factors.
Differences in performance in the schemes in
the un-rehabilitated schemes (groups 3 and 4) are
assumed to be due to IMT and other factors. For the
intensive component, two schemes were selected:
one that had been rehabilitated and transferred and
the other, transferred but not rehabilitated.
As for rainfall, the reference year was
selected only if the annual rainfall did not differ by
more than 25 percent (above or below) of the long-
term average annual rainfall for the area in which
the scheme is located. If this condition was not
met, the “normal” rainfall year closest to the
reference year was selected.
Data Sources
The analysis is based on both time series and
cross-sectional data. Time series covering a
period of 10 years (5 years before transfer and 5
years after) were collected to measure changes in
performance over time at the scheme level.
Information was collected on a number of
performance measures, including finance, O&M,
agricultural productivity, and economic productivity.7
The main source of information comprised records
maintained by various government agencies.
Cross-sectional data were collected through a
questionnaire survey of a sample of farmers from
the two schemes selected for the intensive study
to measure impacts at the farm level. The
objective of the survey was to obtain information
from farmers about their perceptions of changes in
selected performance attributes before and after
turnover. Ninety farmers from each of the two
schemes were selected as samples by stratified
random sampling. The sampling unit was a
selected parcel of land in the irrigation scheme.
The agricultural year immediately preceding the
year of transfer was taken as the “before” period
(pre-IMT reference year) and the latest complete
agricultural year after transfer was taken as the
“after” situation (post-IMT reference year), provided
it was at least 4 to 5 years after the year of
transfer. Key informant interviews were conducted
primarily amongst FO leaders to obtain information
about post-IMT changes in the organization,
operations, maintenance, and financing of irrigation
management.
An assessment survey was done to document
the overall functional condition of irrigation system
infrastructure after transfer and to provide evidence
on the capacity of post-transfer management to
sustain the functionality of irrigation infrastructure.
The capacity to sustain functionality of this
infrastructure was assessed by comparing the level
of investment required to repair dysfunctional and
nearly dysfunctional structures with the recent
average annual level of investment for maintenance
after transfer. Through direct inspection of irrigation
system infrastructure, structures are classified
according to their ability to perform designed
functions. Recent average levels of investment are
indicated by annual volume of work or expenditure
levels for routine maintenance.
Performance Indicators
In this study, performance is measured in
qualitative and quantitative terms. The qualitative
assessment is based on farmer perceptions of
changes in selected performance indicators before
and after turnover. The quantitative analysis is
based primarily on the standard set of indicators
formulated by IWMI to assess the performance of
irrigation schemes (see Molden et al. 1998 ). The
indicators relate to financial, agricultural,
hydrological, and economic performance across
irrigation systems. The indicators require limited
amount of data, and their computation is
straightforward. The specific indicators used to
assess performance and the level at which they
were measured are set out in table 2.
Analyzing Trends in Performance
A major aim of the analysis was to determine the
annual trends in selected performance indicators
during the period 1985-1995, which covered 5
years before turnover (1985-90) and 5 years after
(1991-1995). A set of regression equations was
estimated based on data obtained from the 50
schemes selected for the extensive survey. The
following performance indicators were used as
dependent variables:
• government expenditure for O&M for
1985–1995
• paddy yields (yield/ha), 1985–1995
• cropping intensity (CI), 1985–1995
• standardized gross value of output per hectare
(GVO/ha), 1985–1995
• GVO per cubic meter of water diverted
(GVO/m
3), 1985–1995
Cropping intensities, paddy yields, and GVO
per unit of land and water were adjusted for
seasonal and locational variations and analyzed
as annual values.
Piece-wise linear regression models were
fitted to analyze trends in performance in the two8
TABLE 2.
Performance indicators and the level at which they are measured.
Performance indicators Scheme level Farm level Data source
Financial performance indicators
Annual operations and maintenance cost per hectare X Secondary data
to the government (Irrigation Department)
Irrigation cash costs per hectare to the farmers X Farmer survey
Value of family labor contributions for canal maintenance X Farmer survey
Total irrigation costs per hectare to the farmers X Farmer survey
Operational performance indicators
Farmer perceptions about adequacy, timelines, and equity of X Farmer survey
water supply
Maintenance performance indicators
Percentage of sample canal lengths with critical and noticeable  X Field inspection
defects after transfer
Percentage of structures that are fully functional, partly  X Field inspection
functional, and dysfunctional after transfer
Cost to repair dysfunctional structures relative to the annual X Estimated
average budget
Farmer perceptions about canal conditions before and after X Farmer survey
transfer
Agricultural performance indicators
Cropping intensities by season X Secondary data
(Department of
Agriculture)
Yield of major crops by season X Secondary data
(Department of
Agriculture)
Farmer perceptions about changes in agricultural production X Farmer survey
Economic performance indicators
Standardized gross value of output per hectare5 X Estimated
Standardized gross value of output per unit of water diverted X Estimated
5Standardized Gross Value of Output (SGVO) = (crops Ai Yi Pi ) P world
where, Yi is the yield of crop i; Pi is the local price of crop i; Pworld is the international price of the base crop; Ai is the area cropped
with crop i; Pb is the local price of the base crop. For a detailed explanation of SGVO see Molden et al. 1998.
Pb9
time periods: the period before IMT (1985-90) and
the period after IMT (1991-95). The aim was to
determine whether a performance indicator showed
a particular linear trend from 1985 up to 1990, the
year of transfer, but followed a different trend
thereafter. This involved testing whether there was
a statistically significant difference in the slopes
of the regression lines for the two time periods.
A common set of explanatory variables was
specified in all equations. These included a time
variable (T) to capture the effect of time (in years) on
the dependent variable, and a dummy variable (D1)
to indicate the periods before and after turnover.
The basic regression equation estimated was
as follows:
Yt = 0+ 1T + 2 (T- T*) D1 + e ............ (1)
where, Yt = Performance measure (O&M
costs/ha, yield/ha, CI, GVO/ha,
GVO/ m
3) in year t
T = Time in years (1985.............1995)
T* = Threshold period ( i.e., 1990, the year
of transfer)
D1 = 1 if T, >1990
0 if T<=1990
e = Error term
0......2 = Parameters to be estimated
Assuming E(e) = 0, parameter 1 gives the
slope of the regression line or the trend during the
pre-IMT period (1985–90) and (1+ 2) the trend in
the post-IMT period (1991–95). A test of the
hypothesis that there is a change in the trend
between the two periods was conducted by noting
the statistical significance of the estimated
differential slope coefficient 2.
Results
Impact on Government Expenditures
for O&M
The main interest of the government in transferring
irrigation management at the subsystem level to
FOs was to reduce its own costs for irrigation.
This section examines the trend in government
expenditure for O&M during the period 1985-1995.
The hypothesis advanced is that with the transfer
of O&M responsibilities to FOs, government’s
recurrent cost for irrigation will be lower in the
transferred schemes than in the non-transferred
schemes.
The regression model (equation 1) was used
to analyze trends in government investment with
the annual O&M costs/ha (in 1995 constant US$/
ha) during the period 1985-95 as the dependent
variable. The estimated regression coefficients are
given in table 3. Figures 3A to 3D illustrate the
trend in government’s O&M expenditure in the four
groups of schemes during the period 1985–1995.
The results indicate that in all four groups, there is
a statistically significant declining trend (-1) in
government expenditure for O&M during the pre-
IMT period. In the post-IMT period, there is a
slight reversal in the trend (+2) in all categories of
schemes except the rehabilitated schemes without
IMT and the rehabilitated group. However, the
change in the trend is not statistically significant.
The results suggest that there has been a
decline in government’s recurrent costs for
irrigation during the period 1985–95 across all
categories of schemes irrespective of whether
IMT programs have been introduced or not, but10
TABLE 3.
Estimated regression coefficients for trends in government expenditure for O&M 1985–1995.
Variable description Regression coefficients
Rehabilitated schemes Un-rehabilitated schemes
With IMT Without IMT With IMT Without IMT
Constant (0) 87.04 80.11 86.80 96.72
Trend in government’s O&M cost/ha in - 0.879 -0.794 -0.885 - 0.983
the pre-IMT period (
1) (-5.684)* (-4.269)* (-8.271)* (-5.023)*
The change in trend in government’s O&M costs 0.424 -0.2867 0.346 0.428
in the post-IMT period (2) (1.373) (-0.761) (1.603) (1.078)
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.4439 0.487 0.390
F. statistic 43.42* 52.18* 102.47* 37.265*
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Figures in parentheses are t values.
FIGURE 3A.
Trend in government O&M expenditure in the rehabilitated schemes with IMT.11
FIGURE 3B.
Trend in government O&M expenditure in the rehabilitated schemes without IMT.
FIGURE 3C.
Trend in government O&M expenditure in the un-rehabilitated schemes with IMT.12
FIGURE 3D.
Trend in government O&M expenditure in the un-rehabilitated schemes without IMT.
does not fully support the hypothesis that IMT
leads to a reduction in government expenditure for
O&M.
Cost of Irrigation to Farmers
Traditionally, irrigation water has been supplied
free to farmers in Sri Lanka. Attempts made by
the government in the past to levy a fee from
farmers were largely unsuccessful. The “costs”
of irrigation to farmers are primarily the
contribution of voluntary labor for canal
maintenance and in some instances, the
payment made in kind to the yaya palaka (field
supervisor) employed by the Irrigation
Department to oversee the distribution of
irrigation water. With the introduction of
participatory management, the government
expected FOs to recover the cost of O&M from
farmers (Ratnayake 1995). This section
examines the implications of participatory
management for the cost of irrigation to farmers.
The hypothesis advanced is that, the adoption of
participatory management will increase farmers’
cash costs and labor contribution for irrigation.
The analysis is based on data obtained from a
sample survey of farmers in Nachchaduwa and
Hakwatuna Oya schemes. Three kinds of irrigation
costs were assessed: cash payments, payments
made in kind, and the number of person-days of
family labor contributed to canal maintenance.
Farmers were also asked about any “unofficial”
payments made to obtain irrigation water. Table 4
gives the actual irrigation costs reported by
farmers in the post-transfer reference year
(1994-95). The total cost of irrigation is about the
same (approximately US$15–16/ha) for both
schemes. Data show that after transfer farmers
generally contributed more in the form of unpaid
family labor (56% in Nachchaduwa and 58% in
Hakwatuna Oya) than in cash or kind for canal
maintenance.
In the survey, farmers were asked to compare
irrigation costs in the post-transfer reference year
with costs of irrigation before transfer. About 90
percent of farmers in both schemes claimed that
there was no cash fee on irrigation before
turnover. After the transfer of O&M functions to
FOs, some organizations charged a modest fee
(Rs 50/acre/season or US$2.5/ha/season) for
canal maintenance. The survey results showed13
TABLE 4.
Annual irrigation costs to farmers after IMT (1994–95).
Cost components Units Nachchaduwa Hakwatuna Oya
scheme scheme
Cash costs per hectare a US$/ha 6.34 6.58
 (36) b (50)
Value of unpaid family labor US$/ha 8.18 9.00
contributions for canal maintenance (67) (74)
Total irrigation costs c US$/ha 14.52 15.58
(47) (54)
Source: Farm Survey (July and November, 1996)
a
Irrigation cash costs include cash payments plus the monetary value of payments made in kind.
bFigures in parentheses are the coefficients of variation in percentage terms.
c
Total irrigation cost = Irrigation cash costs + the value of family labor.
that only a minority of farmers (23% in Hakwatuna
Oya and 16% in Nachchaduwa) paid the
maintenance fee.
Figure 4 gives farmers’ perception of changes
in irrigation cost components before and after
turnover. A majority of farmers in both schemes
claimed that payments in kind and unpaid family
labor contributions for canal maintenance had
remained about the same before and after
turnover. In both locations well-defined procedures
for cost recovery have not been established as
yet. Data from the two schemes do not provide
sufficient evidence to suggest an increase in the
cost of irrigation to farmers following the
introduction of participatory management.
Quality of Irrigation Service
This section examines whether the introduction of
participatory irrigation management has resulted in
an improvement in the irrigation service. The
hypothesis advanced is: as farmers have a vested
interest in the irrigation service, involving them
directly in irrigation management would lead to
improvements in the quality of the irrigation
service. Changes in the quality of irrigation service
were assessed in terms of farmer perceptions,
adequacy, timeliness and fairness of water
distribution, and the incidence of irrigation-related
conflicts among farmers before and after transfer.
6
Figure 5 displays farmers’ perceptions about
the quality of irrigation service before and after
transfer. A majority of farmers in both schemes
claimed that water supply in both the wet and dry
seasons was adequate before and after transfer.
However, in Nachchaduwa, about one-third of the
farmers in the head-reach and about 25 percent in
the middle and tail-end areas reported that water
supply had worsened after transfer. Farmers
attributed the worsening of water supply to the
poor quality of work done during rehabilitation prior
to management transfer. The responses of a
majority of farmers in both schemes were similar
with regard to the timeliness of water supply,
fairness of distribution, and the frequency of
conflicts over water distribution, namely, that
these had not changed significantly after transfer.
6The indicators specified by IWMI to measure water supply conditions in irrigation schemes are: Relative Irrigation Supply (RIS) and
Relative Water Supply (RWS). These indicators relate water supply to demand and indicate how tightly supply and demand are matched
(see Molden et al. 1998). Water supply data were not available at the level of the transfer unit (distributary channel).14
What was negative or positive before remained so
afterwards (figure 5).
Impact on Maintenance
To assess the outcomes of maintenance
investment after transfer, the study team
conducted a detailed field inspection of the full
length of main canals, a sample of six distributary
channels in each scheme and all structures along
FIGURE 4.
Farmers’ perception of changes in irrigation costs.
these canal reaches. Canal reaches and
structures were classified as ‘functional’ (F),
‘nearly dysfunctional’ (ND), and ‘dysfunctional’
(D).
7 Canal lengths were considered ‘defective’ if
one of the following problems existed and if it
interfered with the desired hydraulic operation:
• constriction or enlargement of the canal cross
section
• visible siltation and/or encroachment of
freeboard or adjacent road
7A ‘functional’ structure can currently perform its basic design function and shows no signs of losing this capacity within about a year. A
‘nearly dysfunctional’ structure is considered to be likely to become unable to perform its basic function within about one year’s time. A
‘dysfunctional’ structure is one which was unable to perform its basic function at the time of the inspection. For canal reaches, ‘dysfunc-
tional’ means their inability to convey at least 70 percent of the desired flow capacity.15
• visible seepage
• slippage, scouring, or other defect in
embankment
• cracks or other damage to canal lining
Main canals and distributary channels were
divided into quartile reaches. Table 5 shows (for
both schemes) the percentage of total canal
length in each quartile that was defective for main
canals and distributary channels. Despite
rehabilitation in Nachchaduwa, the average
percentage of main canal length that was
defective was about 15 percent in both schemes
(which would be considered relatively high for a
main canal). However, at the level of farmer
investment, the condition of the distributary
channels in Nachchaduwa was significantly better
(only 3.2% defective) than that in Hakwatuna Oya
(about 15% defective).
Table 6 gives the functional condition of
irrigation structures that were inspected. Control,
conveyance, measurement, or ancillary structures
were considered defective (D or ND) if one of the
following conditions was present:
FIGURE 5.
Farmers’ perceptions about the quality of irrigation service before and after IMT.16
TABLE 5.
Functional condition of canal (channel) legths inspected.
Canal Quartile Nachchaduwa Hakwatuna Oya
(channel) type reaches
Length Percent Length Percent
(meters) defective (meters) defective
Main canals Q 1* 10,007 20.5 4,686 5.4
Q 2 10,007 13.5 4,686 14.9
Q 3 10,007 5.7 4,686 39.1
Q 4 10,007 23.7 4,686 2.1
Total 40,027 15.9 18,745 15.4
Distributary Q 1 2,453 11.4 8,164 23.7
channels Q 2 2,453 0 8,164 19.5
Q 3 2,453 1.4 8,164 9.6
Q 4 2,453 0.2 8,164 6.6
Total 9,812 3.2 32,657 14.9
*Listed from head (Q1) to tail-end (Q4) of canals.
TABLE 6.
Functional condition of structures inspected.




Water control 191 44 18.7
Water conveyance 67 1 1.5
Water
measurement 0 0 0
Ancillary 267 1 0.4
Total 525 25 5
Hakwatuna Oya
Water control 164 4 2.4
Water conveyance 180 18 9.1
Water
measurement 3 0 0
Ancillary 177 3 1.7
Total 524 25 517
• Scouring of canal around structures.
• Approach section, rubble pack, and wings of
structures are breaking apart.
• Water control structure cannot control flow as
intended (due to gates or sills missing, eroded
or damaged, significant leakage at gates or
damaged mechanism of movable structures).
• Water measurement structure cannot be used
to measure flow due to damaged or missing
gauge, recorder, or other component.
• Civil works of ancillary structures damaged or
poorly constructed.
Only 5 percent of all structures in both
schemes were dysfunctional. In both
Nachchaduwa and Hakwatuna Oya more than 60
percent of all dysfunctional structures observed at
the distributary level had been dysfunctional for
less than 1 year. In Nachchaduwa 72 percent had
been dysfunctional for less than 2 years; in
Hakwatuna Oya this ratio was 94 percent. There
is no indication of significant long-term deferral of
maintenance by farmers in Hakwatuna Oya.
However, in Nachchaduwa 5 of the 18
dysfunctional structures (28%) had been
dysfunctional for 3 to 4 years. This is probably
because of the extended rehabilitation program
and the expectation that the government would
eventually repair the dysfunctional structures.
The study team, working together with
maintenance staff of the Irrigation Department,
also estimated the cost, using local materials and
labor, to repair all canal lengths and structures
that were identified as dysfunctional or nearly
dysfunctional. In tables 7 and 8, the cost estimate
for repairing all dysfunctional canal lengths and
structures is referred to as the Essential
Maintenance Requirement (row 3). The cost
estimate for repairing all nearly dysfunctional canal
lengths and structures is referred to as the
Preventive Maintenance Requirement (row 4). The
combination of the two is termed the Total
Accumulated Maintenance Requirement (row 5),
which means maintenance problems that have
been deferred from routine maintenance.
The Maintenance Investment Capacity Ratio
(MIC ratio, row 6) compares the level of average
annual maintenance budget (row 2), after transfer,
TABLE 7.
Maintenance investment capacity in the Nachchaduwa scheme (in 1995 US$/ha).
Maintenance expenditures Main system Distributary Entire scheme
and requirements per ha  level canal level
Average annual maintenance budget 1.98 1.71 3.69
Essential maintenance requirement 3.83 0.35 4.18
Preventive maintenance requirement 1.0 0.51 0.61
Total accumulated maintenance requirement* 3.93 0.86 4.79
MIC ratio [Row 2/Row 5] 0.5 2.0 0.8
Annual requirement for routine +
accumulated maintenance** 6.15 2.23 8.08
Required budget increase 211% 30% 119 %
*Accumulated maintenance is a total of essential plus preventive maintenance.  ** Assumes essential maintenance is completed in 1 year
and preventive maintenance is completed over 3 years.18
TABLE 8.
Maintenance investment capacity in the Hakwatuna Oya scheme (in 1995 US$/ha).
Maintenance expenditures and Main system Distributary Entire scheme
requirements per ha  level  canal level
Average annual maintenance budget 1.26 1.36 2.62
Essential maintenance requirement 2.69 2.54 5.23
Preventive maintenance requirement 0.27 3.58 3.85
Total accumulated maintenance requirement* 2.96 6.12 9.08
MIC ratio [R2/R6] 0.4 0.2 0.3
Annual requirement for routine
+ accumulated maintenance** 4.04 5.10 9.14
Required budget increase 221% 275% 249%
*Accumulated maintenance is a total of essential plus preventive maintenance.  ** Assumes essential maintenance is completed in 1 year
and preventive maintenance is completed over 3 years.
with the total Accumulated Maintenance
Requirement. This is an indicator of the extent to
which scheme management is capable of taking
care of the backlog of accumulated maintenance
needs at the average level of routine maintenance
expenditure. If we add routine and accumulated
maintenance requirements together (row 7) and
compare this to routine expenditure, we have a
value which is the percentage by which routine
expenditure would have to increase in order to
take care of all routine, essential, and preventive
maintenance requirements within 3 years (row 8).
For Nachchaduwa, table 7 shows an MIC ratio
of 2 at the distributary channel level, which means
that the average annual expenditure for
maintenance is twice the size of the relatively
small accumulated maintenance requirement. The
FOs are in a relatively good position to handle
maintenance. The organizations would only have
to increase their annual maintenance budget by
about 30 percent in order to eliminate the backlog.
The situation is quite different in Hakwatuna Oya
(table 8), where the MIC ratio is 0.2, which
indicates that the average annual maintenance
investment is only one-fifth the size of the cost of
eliminating the deferred maintenance requirement.
It would take an increase in the annual budget of
275 percent to handle routine maintenance and
eliminate the backlog within 3 years. The MIC
ratios at the main system level (for which the
government remains responsible) are similar, at
0.5 and 0.4 for Nachchaduwa and Hakwatuna
Oya, respectively. In Nachchaduwa, despite the
rehabilitation, the government is less capable of
handling maintenance requirements at its level of
responsibility than are the farmers at their level.
The reverse is true in Hakwatuna Oya.
Finally, on the whole, farmer perceptions of
the quality of maintenance are more negative in
Nachchaduwa than in Hakwatuna Oya (figure 6).
In Nachchaduwa, nearly 60 percent of all farmers
interviewed felt that the functional condition of the
canal system was worse after management
transfer. This implies extensive farmer
dissatisfaction with the rehabilitation, which was
done without farmer participation. In Hakwatuna
Oya, farmers were more evenly split in their views
about whether the functional condition of canal
infrastructure was better or worse after
management transfer.19
Impact on Agricultural Production
Although irrigation schemes contribute about two-
thirds of the national rice output, there is growing
concern about low cropping intensities and
stagnation of the rice yield level in the schemes.
Problems related to irrigation are considered to be
a major reason for the stagnation of yield levels in
the schemes (National Development Council
1996). If the shift of primary responsibility for
water distribution to FO leads to an improvement
in the quality of irrigation service, one could
expect cropping intensities to improve and farmers
to use more inputs due to greater confidence in
the irrigation service, which in turn would lead to
higher yields. This proposition is tested by
examining the trend in paddy yields and cropping
intensities in 50 schemes over the 10-year period
1985-95. The analysis was done separately for
rehabilitated and un-rehabilitated schemes with
and without IMT.
FIGURE 6.
Farmers’ perceptions of functional condition of canals.20
Trends in Paddy Yields
The trend in paddy yields during the period
1985–95 is estimated using regression equation
(1). The results are given in table 9. Figures 7A to
7D give the yield trends for each group.
The results indicate that in the pre-IMT period,
paddy yields in the rehabilitated schemes,
irrespective of whether they were transferred or
not, show a declining trend (-1). The decline is
statistically significant in the schemes with IMT
and rehabilitation. During the same period, yields
in the un-rehabilitated scheme show a statistically
significant upward trend (+1). In the post-IMT
period, there is a statistically significant upward
shift in paddy yields in the group showing the
effects of both rehabilitation and management
transfer (2 = 245.54). There is no statistically
significant change in trends in the schemes that
had been rehabilitated but not transferred and
those that had been transferred but not
rehabilitated. In the post-IMT period, paddy yields
in the group without the two forms of intervention
show a statistically significant declining trend
when compared to the pre-IMT period. The
conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that
there has been a significant improvement in yields
in the schemes that have undergone both
management transfer and rehabilitation. There is
no statistically significant change in yield trends in
schemes with only one type of intervention, and
those without any of the two forms of intervention
show a significant decline in yields. These
findings are consistent results from the Gal Oya
scheme in Sri Lanka (Amerasinghe et al. 1998).
Cropping Intensities8
The regression model 1 was used to analyze
trends in cropping intensities in the different
groups of schemes. The estimated regression
coefficients are given in table 10. The analysis
indicates that there are no significant differences
in the trends in cropping intensities in any of the
four groups of schemes in the periods before and
after transfer.
TABLE 9.
Estimated regression coefficients explaining trends in paddy yield in the selected schemes, 1985-95.
Variable description Regression coefficients
Rehabilitated schemes Un-rehabilitated schemes
With IMT Without IMT With IMT Without IMT
Constant 12941 5163 - 1761.38 -3558.15
Trend in paddy yields in the pre-IMT -98.79 (-2.875)* -6.32 (-2.219)
period (1) 61.14 (2.338)* 89.83 (3.088)*
The change in trend in paddy yields in the 245.54 (3.799)* -0.70 (-0.219)
post-IMT period (2) -52.09 (-1.06) -93.66 (- 1.728)*
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.08
F. statistic 7.81* 0.124 5.18* 7.72*
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Figures in parentheses are t values.
8Cropping intensity =  Area cultivated in first (maha) season + area cultivated in second (yala) season x 100
Cultivable area21
FIGURE 7A.
Trend in paddy yields in rehabilitated schemes with IMT.
FIGURE 7B.
Trend in paddy yields in rehabilitated schemes without IMT.22
FIGURE 7C.
Trend in paddy yields in un-rehabilitated schemes with IMT.
FIGURE 7D.
Trend in paddy yields in un-rehabilitated schemes without IMT.
Economic Returns per Unit of Land
and Water
Economic returns per unit of land and water are
measured in terms of the gross value of output
(GVO) per hectare of cultivated land and per cubic
meter of water respectively. Rice is the major crop
grown in the major irrigation schemes in Sri
Lanka. In recent years there has been an increase
in cultivation of non-rice crops particularly in the
dry season. But, as there is no reliable data on
the extents cultivated and yields of non-rice crops23
in the schemes, the valuation of output is based
solely in terms of the amount of paddy (rough
rice) produced. GVOs for the various schemes
were first computed on the basis of the average
price of paddy in the district in which they were
located. The value was then “standardized” using
the international price of rice and expressed in
terms of constant 1995 US dollars.
9
TABLE 10.
Estimated regression coefficients explaining trends in cropping intensities in the selected schemes, 1985-95.
Variable description Regression coefficients
Rehabilitated schemes Un-rehabilitated schemes
With IMT Without IMT With IMT Without IMT
Constant -34.16 242.63 372.87 -27.21
Trend in cropping intensities in the pre- 1.797 (0.578) -1.356 (0.551)
IMT period (1) -2.49 (-1.158) 1.57 (0.496)
The change in trend in cropping 5.878 (0.937) 5.545 (1.133)
intensities in the post-IMT period (2) 7.026 (1.645) -0.375 (0.058)
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01
F. statistic 4.31 1.041 1.511 0.424
Numbers within parentheses are t values.
Returns per Unit of Land
The trend in the economic returns per unit of land
during the period 1985-95 was estimated using
equation 1. The standardized GVO/ha was
specified as the dependent variable with the same
set of explanatory variables specified in the
equation. The estimated regression coefficients
are given in table 11.
TABLE 11.
Estimated regression coefficients explaining trends in the gross value of output (GVO)/ha in the selected schemes,
1985–95.
Variable description Regression coefficients
Rehabilitated schemes Un-rehabilitated schemes
With IMT Without IMT With IMT Without IMT
Constant 3689 2223.62 877.06 728.60
Trend in GVO/ha in the pre-IMT period (1) - 32.10 - 14.52 - 1.50 1.88
(- 4.09)** (- 2.373) (-0.258) (0.296)
The change in trend in GVO/ha in the post- 68.07 21.79* 10.29 - 0.055
IMT period (2) (4.587)** (1.914) (0.950) (- 0.005)
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.02 0.012 0.01
F. statistic 10.522** 2.899* 1.234 0.227
Figures in parentheses are t values.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
9The method of estimating the standardized gross value of output is explained in Molden et al. 1998.24
The results show that in the pre-IMT period
three of the four groups of schemes show a
decline in the GVO/ha (-1). The decline is
statistically significant only in the group where
both rehabilitation and IMT had occurred. In the
post-IMT period there is a statistically significant
upward shift in the GVO/ha in the rehabilitated
schemes. The rate of increase of GVO/ha in
schemes, with the effects of management transfer
and rehabilitation, is higher than in those which
have been rehabilitated only. There is no
statistically significant difference in the trend in
GVO/ha in un-rehabilitated schemes during the
reference period.
Returns per Unit of Water
Returns per unit of water were estimated in terms
of gross value of output (GVO) per unit of water
diverted. As most of the un-rehabilitated schemes
did not have accurate time-series on irrigation
releases, the analysis is confined to the schemes
that had undergone rehabilitation. Table 12 gives
the estimated regression coefficients of the
parameters used to estimate trends in the GVO
per unit of water diverted (GVO/m
3). Figures 8A
and 8B display the trend in GVO/m
3 during the
period 1985–95. In the pre-IMT period, both
categories of schemes show a slight (statistically
not significant) declining trend in the productivity
of water. In the post-IMT period, there is a
statistically significant reversal in the trend,
irrespective of whether the schemes had been
transferred or not. These results suggest that
rehabilitation rather than IMT may be the major
contributing factor for the improvements in the
productivity of water experienced in the post-IMT
period.
TABLE 12.
Estimated regression coefficients explaining trends in the productivity of water in the selected schemes, 1985–95.
Variable description Regression coefficients
Rehabilitated schemes Un-rehabilitated schemes
With IMT Without IMT With IMT Without IMT
Constant 0.181 0.135 – –
Trend in GVO/m3 in the pre-IMT period (1) -0.001 -.001 – –
(-1.323) -(0.400)
The change in trend GVO/m3 in the post-IMT 0.003 0.005 – –
period (2) (1.710)* (1.693)*
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.11 – –
F. statistic 1.54 0.011* – –
Figures in parentheses are t values.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.25
FIGURE 8A.
Trend in the productivity of water in the rehabilitated schemes with IMT.
FIGURE 8B.
Trend in the productivity of water in the rehabilitated schemes with without IMT.26
Conclusions
This study was undertaken with two objectives in
mind: first, to validate empirically the methodology
developed by IWMI to assess the impacts of
management devolution and second, to document
the effects of the participatory irrigation manage-
ment program on the performance of irrigation
schemes in Sri Lanka. Based on the case study,
this section reflects on the methodology and
summarizes the results of the analysis of the
impacts of the participatory irrigation management
program in Sri Lanka.
Review of the Methodology
The principal aim of the methodology advocated in
this text is to gauge the extent to which IMT has
resulted in some movement or change in selected
measures of performance of irrigation systems.
The aim was to measure the direction of change,
rather than changes in the absolute value of the
performance indicators. The application of the
impact assessment methodology to the irrigation
systems in Sri Lanka has shown that, where the
required data are available, the combination of
performance measures, compared before and
after, and with and without the intervention, can
yield a comprehensive picture of the impacts of
management transfer. The selected performance
measures cover financial, hydrological,
agricultural, and economic aspects.
Early attempts to obtain farmer estimates of
crop yields and expenditures on maintenance
before transfer showed that farmers could not
recall data as far back as 5 to 6 years in the
past. Historical data on crop yields and irrigation
costs were available only as aggregates for the
scheme as a whole. This limited the possibility of
assessing quantitatively changes in performance
over time. Farmer comparisons of performance
indicators before and after transfer could only be
qualitative in nature. It proved effective, however,
to first obtain quantitative estimates by farmers of
recent yields, input usage and expenditures on
maintenance, and then ask qualitative questions
about the direction of change that had occurred
since transfer.
As for assessing the impacts of management
transfer on the physical infrastructure, it was not
possible to have inspections of the canal networks
before transfer, to enable a direct comparison.
However, infrastructure assessment as carried out
in this study proved to be a reasonably effective
way to assess: 1) the functional condition of the
schemes after transfer and 2) the capacity of FOs
to ensure the physical sustainability of the
schemes after transfer.
One limitation of the methodology is that data
collection can be very demanding, particularly
when attempts are made to measure changes in
performance over time. In many developing
countries reliable time series will not be available.
Under such circumstances comparisons of
schemes which have and have not yet been
transferred may be important, as may be the use
of remote sensing, qualitative historical
assessments by key informants, and the use of
participatory rural appraisal techniques.
Impacts of Participatory Irrigation
Management in Sri Lanka
The evidence provided in this report suggests that
participatory irrigation management entails a partial
devolution of decision making authority to farmers.
The main concern of the government has been on
setting up of farmer organizations. This initiative
and the creation of farmer-agency joint project
management committees, have apparently
improved communication between farmers and
agency personnel, and have fostered greater
farmer participation in decision making. Yet,
government intervention at the level of the transfer
unit remains strong.27
The evidence from this study leads to the
following conclusions on the impact of the
participatory irrigation management program on the
performance of irrigation schemes:
• There has been a substantial decline in
government expenditure on irrigation,
beginning before transfer. The declining trend
is not confined to schemes where IMT had
occurred but, is common to non-IMT schemes
as well. However, the analysis suggests that
in schemes where participatory management
has been introduced, government investments
have increased in the 5-year period after
transfer. The rate of change in government
expenditure is statistically significant in the
case of schemes that have been rehabilitated
and transferred.
• The reforms have not generated an
appreciable increase in the costs of irrigation
to farmers. Farmers generally make fewer
direct payments (in cash and kind), but
contribute more labor for canal maintenance.
• Management transfer alone did not bring about
significant changes in the quality of irrigation
services.
• Management transfer alone did not result in
significant improvements in agricultural
production levels or the gross value of
agricultural production per unit of land or per
unit of water diverted. Neither did rehabilitation
alone create significant effects. However, in
schemes where both management transfer
and rehabilitation have occurred, significant
effects on agricultural productivity levels and
economic returns were observed.
• The infrastructure inspections revealed a
serious underinvestment in maintenance. To
eliminate the backlog of deferred maintenance,
both the government and the farmers would
have to increase investments in maintenance
substantially. This raises concerns about





Nachchaduwa and Hakwatuna Oya irrigation
schemes were selected for the intensive study
(see figure 1). Both are ancient irrigation systems.
Nachchaduwa was restored in 1906. It was last
rehabilitated between 1984 and 1991 under the
Major Irrigation Rehabilitation Project without
significant participation of farmers. Although
management transfer and rehabilitation were two
separate and uncoordinated events, they both
overlapped in time. By 1990, the year of transfer,
all major repair works had been done and only
repairs in the lower part of the scheme remained.
For the propose of this study, Nachchaduwa is
considered as a scheme showing the effects of
both management transfer and rehabilitation.
Hakwatuna Oya scheme was restored in the
early 1960s. Substantial investments in physical
improvements were made in the early 1980s under
a World Bank-sponsored integrated district
development program. Since then, there has not
been a significant investment in the physical
infrastructure. Hakwatuna Oya is considered as a
case of management transfer without the effects
of rehabilitation. Table A1 gives the key physical
and socioeconomic characteristics of the two
schemes.
TABLE A1.
Basic characteristics of Hakwatuna Oya and Nachchaduwa irrigation schemes.
Hakwatuna Oya Nachchaduwa
Administrative location/district Kurunegala Anuradhapura
Agro-ecological zone North Central Intermediate Zone North Central Dry Zone
Average annual rainfall 1,610mm 1,473mm
Period of establishment Ancient; restored in 1960s Ancient; restored in 1906
Design command area 1,740 ha 2,383 ha
Functional irrigated area 2,407 ha 2,833 ha
Capacity of main reservoir 23.43 Mm3 55.69 Mm3
Canal lengths (main) Right Bank - 11.36 km High Level - 28.18 km
Left Bank - 4.54 km Low Level - 11.89 km
No. of  distributaty channels 28 23
Soil type Reddish Brown Earths Reddish Brown Earths
No. of farm families 2,178 3,027
Farm sizes 2 ha (average) 0.5 - 6 ha
Cropping pattern in irrigated area:
Maha (wet) season Paddy Paddy
Yala (dry) season Paddy + Other Field Crops Paddy + Other Field Crops
Field channel groups 96 187
Distributary channel organizations (DCOs) 13 16
DCOs officially registered 12 1629
TABLE A2.
Transfer activities in Hakwatuna Oya and Nachchaduwa.
Transfer activities Hakwatuna Oya Nachchaduwa
Period of establishment of water user associations 1988–1990 1986–1990
Training farmer representatives Yes Yes
Training management staff Yes Yes
Revising O&M procedures and/or plans Yes Yes
Revising water charges No No
Reducing/eliminating govt. financing Yes Yes
Retrenching of government staff No No
Repairing/improving intake and/or main canals No No
Repairing/improving subsidiary canals and structures Yes Yes
Farmer participation in prioritizing improvements Yes Yes
Farmer investment in improvements Minor Minor
Agreeing about future responsibility for rehabilitation No No
TABLE A3.
Responsibilities vested with the FO.
Agreements and functions Hakwatuna Oya Nachchaduwa
Year of transfer 1990–1995 1990–1991
Legal water right at level of scheme or FO No No
FO is legal entity? Partial Partial
FO leaders selected by farmers? Yes Yes
FO has authority to make rules and sanctions? Partial Partial
Authority to make O&M plans and budgets Partial Partial
Authority to set water charges Yes Yes
Authority to hire staff Yes Yes
Release management staff No No
Maximum sanction available to FO Levy fines Levy fines
Maximum sanction applied since transfer None None
Control over intake No No
Control over subsidiary canal system Yes Yes
Responsibility for future rehabilitation No No
Canal rights of way Partial Partial
Right to make contracts and raise additional revenue Yes Yes
FO has rights to make profits? Yes Yes
Source: Scheme level data records
Interview of FO leaders (July, December 1996).
Both schemes were brought under the
Integrated Management of Irrigation Schemes
program launched in 1984. Initiatives to form FOs
were made in 1988 and by 1990 in Hakwatuna
Oya and Nachchaduwa there were 13 and 16 FOs,
respectively, at the distributary channel level.
Table A2 summarizes the key activities during the
transfer process and the institutional arrangements
while table A3 summarizes the functions vested
with FOs after transfer in the two schemes.30
B. Schemes Selected for the Extensive Component
Name Location/ Type of intervention Design area Functional
District (ha) irrig. area (ha)
1 Basawakkulama A’pura IMT + Rehab 156 186
2 Halpan Ela A’pura IMT + Rehab 239 240
3 Hurulu Wewa A’pura IMT + Rehab 3,866 7,668
4 Nachchaduwa Tank A’pura IMT + Rehab 2,382 2,747
5 Nuwara Wewa A’pura IMT + Rehab 971 971
6 Rajanganaya Tank A’pura IMT + Rehab 6,616 6,223
7 Turuwila Tank A’pura IMT + Rehab 187 600
8 Ambakola Wewa Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 340 340
9 Attaragalle Tank Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 419 419
10 Ethimale Tank Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 406 340
11 Hakwatuna Oya Tank Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 1,546 2,093
12 Hambegamuwa Tank Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 271 283
13 Handapanagala Wewa Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 648 648
14 Kimbulwana Oya Tank Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 558 674
15 Kotiyagala Tank Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 450 242
16 Labunoruwa Tank A’pura IMT + No Rehab 167 258
17 Maha Kanadarawa Tank A’pura IMT + No Rehab 2,468 2,469
18 Maha Siyabalangamuwa Tank Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 165 197
19 Maha Willachchiya Tank A’pura IMT + No Rehab 1,078 1,390
20 Manankattiya Tank A’pura IMT + No Rehab 607 615
21 Meddaketiya Tank Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 208 208
22 Mutukandiya Tank Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 810 900
23 Palukadawala Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 820 820
24 Sangilikanadarawa Wewa A’pura IMT + No Rehab 263 340
25 Usgala Siyambalangamuwa Kurunegala IMT + No Rehab 850 850
26 Wahalkada A’pura IMT + No Rehab 810 2,000
27 Yudaganawa Tank Monaragala IMT + No Rehab 102 182
28 Balaharuwa Tank Monaragala No IMT + Rehab 102 102
29 Bandagiriya Tank Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 660 660
30 Batalgoda Tank Kurunegala No IMT + Rehab 2,549 3,238
31 Debara Wewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 382 385
32 Maha Galgamuwa Tank Kurunegala No IMT + Rehab 163 163
33 Pattiyapola Mahawewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 190 230
34 Pannagamuwa Wewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 191 191
35 Tissa Wewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 1,112 1,280
36 Tisa Wewa A’pura No IMT + Rehab 434 902
37 Weerawila Wewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 1,100 1,100
38 Wennoruwa Tank Kurunegala No IMT + Rehab 190 190
39 Yoda Wewa Hambantota No IMT + Rehab 1,322 1,416
40 Horiwila Tank (Palugas Wewa) A’pura No IMT + No Rehab 231 209
41 Kallanchiya Wewa A’pura No IMT + No Rehab 243 243
42 Magalla Tank Kurunegala No IMT + No Rehab 5,654 5,654
43 Maha Mankadawala Wewa A’pura No IMT + No Rehab 157 400
44 Maha Lindawewa Tank A’pura No IMT + No Rehab 179 442
45 Mahananneriya Kurunegala No IMT + No Rehab 172 172
46 Maminiyawa Tank A’pura No IMT + No Rehab 204 204
47 Mediyawa Tank Kurunegala No IMT + No Rehab 485 486
48 Murutawela Tank Hambantota No IMT + No Rehab 1,306 1,711
49 Ridiyagama Tank Hambantota No IMT + No Rehab 2,738 3,026
50 Udukiriwila Tank Hambantota No IMT + No Rehab 298 316
Note: A’pura = Anuradhapura; Rehab = Rehabilitation.31
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